CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 March 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 673rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and my own, to the Director-General for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of Austria, Ambassador Hohenfellner, who will be our first speaker today.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Austria and Sri Lanka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group on its thirty-seventh session, which has been circulated as document CD/1245, as well as the representatives of Japan, the United States of America and France.

It gives me great pleasure to give the floor to the representative of Austria, a good and old friend of ours, the Director-General for Political Affairs in Vienna, Ambassador Hohenfellner.

Mr. HOHENFELLNER (Austria): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and welcome in you not only a very good friend but also the representative of Germany, a neighbouring country to which we are bound by many friendly ties. We also remember with great pleasure the time you were Ambassador of your country in the Austrian capital, Vienna. I would equally like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Errera of France, who very skilfully managed to organize the take-off of this year's session. We also welcome the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, also a good friend, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, as the new Secretary-General of the Conference. His experience as former Under-Secretary-General responsible for disarmament affairs will certainly further enhance the work of this Conference. Last but not least we also congratulate Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, whose merits we had already stressed in this forum a year ago, for having been appointed to the important function of Deputy Secretary-General of the CD.

The fogs of uncertainty which obscured last year's CD session have by now risen. On 10 August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament, by deciding to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, has now set itself a new and important goal. On 25 January this year, the direction was further clarified by the adoption of a well-defined mandate for the CTBT negotiations and, finally, on 1 February, a consensus could be reached on the designation of a successor to Ambassador Tanaka as Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee.

We congratulate also an old friend Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for having been elected to chair this very important committee as a former student of Nobel Peace Prize winner Alfonso García Robles. In the same year when García Robles graduated in international law, the Nobel Prize for Physics was awarded to the Austrian scientist Victor Franz Hess, who, after World War II, strongly opposed nuclear tests. Hess's research principally dealt with radioactivity and atmospheric electricity. It brought him eventually to the

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study of radioactive fallout from nuclear bombs. Symbolizing the legal and scientific endeavours to be undertaken in the working groups explicitly foreseen by the NTB mandate, these two brilliant personalities stand for the genuine search for peace which ought always to prevail over military considerations.

The end of the cold war has brought with it a whole set of far-reaching measures in the field of nuclear disarmament: treaties like START II, in which the United States of America and the Russian Federation agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by more than 70 per cent, would not have been achieved without the sweeping changes of recent years. These profound changes in world affairs have set the wider political framework for nuclear disarmament and arms control. Now, after the political thaw which permitted a number of formerly "frozen" topics to surface, the international community sees itself confronted by an impressive negotiation package on nuclear issues. This package will require careful handling, lest it falls apart. It is composed of the following elements: the already mentioned CD negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban; the review conference foreseen in article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the extension conference foreseen by article X of the same treaty, which will be held together with the review conference in April/May 1995; the forthcoming negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and, finally, the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament's Ac Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, referred to as the Ad Hoc Committee on "negative security assurances".

While some countries stress that no positive outcome could be expected from the 1995 NPT review and extension conference unless substantial progress is achieved on a CTBT and the so-called "negative security assurances" negotiations, other representatives point to the opposite, i.e. that no substantial progress will be made in the field of a CTBT, unless an indefinite extension of the NPT has been accepted by all States parties. Our minds rather ought to be focused on mutual benefit options encompassing the nuclear negotiation package as a whole, bearing in mind that the elements of this package have a mutual influence on each other. Since agreement would in any case not mean the end of the discussions on nuclear issues, but rather a new beginning, it seems to us to be wiser to pursue a partnership rather than a confrontational approach.

As for the Austrian priorities with regard to the issues to be tackled in the framework of the nuclear negotiation package, we start from an analysis which was incorporated in the preamble of the NPT itself: as a matter of fact, we do believe - and here I quote - "that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war". Hence, probability calculus applied to nuclear proliferation makes it evident to us that the more countries acquire nuclear strike capabilities, the higher is the nuclear threat. Therefore, the NPT remains for us the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime which ought to be both strengthened and extended indefinitely. In this context, I would like to reiterate the hope of my Government that the Ukrainian Parliament will agree to early ratification

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of the NPT so that Ukraine will be in a position to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. We were encouraged by the statement of Mr. Hryshchenko in this forum on 10 February 1994, informing us about the parliamentary authorization given to the Ukrainian President to exchange the instruments of ratification on START. We trust swift accession to the NPT will follow.

In our view, a CTBT should contribute to furthering the non-proliferation goals of the NPT, but this cannot remain the sole aim. The fact that nuclear test explosions can easily have serious consequences for people and their environment is a sufficient reason to ban them once and for all. Austria will make every effort to contribute to an early successful conclusion of these negotiations.

Nuclear non-proliferation would also significantly benefit from a multilateral and verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices. Negotiations on this subject should therefore start swiftly. Austria has already enacted a law on the establishment of a security control system, on the safeguarding of nuclear material and nuclear equipment and on export controls.

Finally, like almost all members of the international community, we recognize that effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. We share your view that the demand for negative security assurances is a legitimate interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It goes without saying that we welcome Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium in the chair of the Ad Hoc Committee which has been entrusted with the task to move this matter forward. In the light of comments received we are now in the process of revising the provisions of our draft treaty text on negative security assurances.

We think that all nuclear arms control and disarmament issues are intrinsically interrelated. Therefore, we do not think that we should trade one particular subject for another, but rather hope that significant progress will be achieved on all aspects of the nuclear negotiation package.

We have noted with satisfaction that the expertise of IAEA is being increasingly used by the world community in many different situations. We are certain that the wealth of knowledge this organization has accumulated over the past 35 years will also be most valuable to a future CTBT verification regime. We think that such a verification regime could operate most efficiently and cost-effectively either entrusted to IAEA or - should this pose difficulties - in close proximity to IAEA.

At the end of my statement, I would like to take the opportunity of my presence in the Conference on Disarmament to address the subject of the expansion of this body. In this context, let me first express our appreciation for your two predecessors in the presidency whose excellent work has led us closer to the overdue resolution of this issue. I will not repeat here the reasons why we think that Austria deserves a place as a new member of

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this Conference, since my country has already been included in the list of States proposed for full membership. In any case, please be assured of our full support in your endeavours to achieve a breakthrough which, in our opinion, will have the best chances to happen if based on the report submitted last year to the Conference by Ambassador O'Sullivan.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Ambassador Hohenfellner, for your important statement and for the kind words you addressed to me and to my country. I give now the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, this is the first time my delegation is taking the floor during the initial part of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Permit me, therefore, to extend to you congratulations and best wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency. My delegation is confident that you would successfully steer the work of the Conference in the coming weeks.

My delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation of your immediate predecessors Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Gérard Errera of France for the excellent contributions to the Conference during their respective stewardships. Their deep commitment and devotion to the Conference was a source of satisfaction and inspiration to my delegation.

Let me also join the previous speakers in extending our greetings to Mr. Vladimir F. Petrovsky, on his appointment as the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Conference on Disarmament. Similarly, I am happy to offer congratulations of my delegation to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail on his appointment as new Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

I would like to welcome into our fold the new colleagues Ambassador Hocine Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Ibrahim Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Alessandro Vattani of Italy, Ambassador Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Ambassador Bjoern Skogmo of Norway. We wish them a happy and fruitful stay in Geneva.

It would be a dereliction of my duty, if I fail to remember Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia who left the CD on 28 February. His contribution to the work of the Conference cannot be summed up in a few words. Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan will be remembered by us for the very substantial contribution he made during the CWC negotiations, and as Co-ordinator assigned with the function of the expansion of the CD membership.

Mr. President, my delegation was pleased to note the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt the past year's pragmatic programme of work upon your recommendation, which would facilitate continuity of the deliberations of the Conference this year. It is the view of my delegation that the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the occasion of the inauguration of the 1994 session of the Conference, together

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with the Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of its work, constitutes an appropriate guide for the smooth and productive conduct of the work of the Conference.

Given its importance, my delegation would like to deal with the items on this year's agenda which are related to the main aspects of nuclear disarmament. One of the most important tasks that the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to fulfil during its current session is to commence immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). The importance that the international community attaches to a CTBT is clearly seen from the fact that more than 150 Member States co-sponsored the United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/70, which urged the Conference on Disarmament "to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of such a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty". The trust and the confidence placed in the Conference by the General Assembly must be maintained.

In the discharge of the responsibilities entrusted to it, it is important for the CD to agree on a set of priorities to conduct its work. Most significant among them is the need to commence negotiations immediately and conduct those negotiations in all honesty and sincerity with a view to concluding them with the least possible delay. On our part, we support those delegations who expressed their desire to conclude negotiations during 1994. In this regard, my delegation is heartened to note that some delegations have already submitted draft structural outlines for a CTBT. It is the hope of my delegation that the CD would reach agreement on this matter soon, which will facilitate commencing our substantive work on a draft treaty.

We should not begin our negotiations with a preconceived notion that one group of countries - either the nuclear-weapon States or, for that matter, the non-nuclear-weapon States - is making concessions to the other group. This is a common endeavour, and its final outcome would be to the benefit of the present and future generations.

An equally important factor is the need to continue current nuclear test moratoria. The nuclear-weapon States should permit CTBT negotiations to be conducted in an atmosphere devoid of nuclear-weapon tests. While welcoming the example-setting call made by the United States Administration to other nuclear-weapon States, we urge those States (NWS) to facilitate negotiations by not undertaking nuclear tests during this crucial period.

In the course of the first part of this session so far, many delegations have expressed their views in regard to major aspects of a CTBT. My delegation would welcome a draft CTBT to embody the following elements.

A clear and unambiguous definition of what constitutes nuclear testing. Several delegations have expressed the view that the definition contained in article I of the 1963 PTBT, which covers "any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion", is a basis for the CD to proceed on this matter. Indeed, this formulation provides us with a base to start our work on the definition.

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My delegation shares the view expressed by several delegations that the CTBT should be comprehensive in scope, and it should ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

The treaty should cover all types of nuclear tests, both for military and peaceful purposes. We recognize the fact that non-military nuclear explosions could be conducted to acnieve certain engineering and scientific benefits. However, due to a variety of factors, including economic reasons and growing public awareness and objections, not much progress has been reached in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions. Despite the fact that the NPT provides for and even encourages maximization of benefits from peaceful explosions, the difficulty is in relation to a distinction between a peaceful explosion and an explosion meant for military applications. With a treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests, the urge to seek military benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions would be quite considerable. We should, therefore, not provide for tests which are described as explosions for peaceful purposes, as such tests could be used to obtain weapons-related information.

In its application and verification, the treaty should be non-discriminatory for all participants. Verification should be international in character and geared to effective monitoring and compliance using seismic and non-seismic monitoring and on-site inspection. In view of the high cost of monitoring, care should be taken to ensure that the verification regime is cost-effective and for this purpose due consideration should be given as to how such a regime could utilize existing international mechanisms, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

One of the most important aspects worthy of mention falls into the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The PTBT should not be used as a pretext to deny the non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly the NPT countries, their right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as has been provided for in article IV of the NPT. The apprehensions expressed by developing countries during the CWC negotiations and indeed after the signing of the Convention should be borne in mind in addressing the task of drafting the treaty.

These are but a few areas which the Conference has to focus on, in the coming months. Given our experience with the CWC, it is only normal to expect further inputs by interested delegations to facilitate the Conference in the task of carrying out its mandate. The current co-operative international environment facilitated by the end of the cold war politics affords the Conference a golden opportunity to negotiate a treaty banning all nuclear tests. We should seize this window of opportunity to conduct our negotiations in an expeditious manner. As the United States President Clinton himself recently observed, "This challenging, but crucial, objective is the Conference's top priority". I would like to assure you and members of the CD of our full support and cooperation towards the realization of this objective, hopefully by December 1994.

Although not directly linked, yet related to the subject of CTBT, are issues connected to non-proliferation. Being one of the first signatories from the South Asian region, Sri Lanka has an abiding interest in the NPT.

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With over 150 States parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to of all arms control agreements. As we come closer to its 1995 review and extension conference, we ought to take a dispassionate view of the Treaty and look into the shortcomings of its implementation so far and address them fairly and squarely. Above all, we have to recognize the fact that since the entry into force of the NPT, many a country has crossed the threshold and acquired nuclear-weapons capability. Against this background, we should take all measures within our means to secure universal adherence to, and compliance with, the convention. Equally important is for nuclear-weapon States (NWS) not to seek to use the Conference merely to tighten horizontal proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate their good will by taking effective steps to take deeper cuts into vertical proliferation and also live up to the commitments made under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Sri Lanka wishes to see the successful conclusion of the fifth NPT review and extension conference. We also wish to see the non-members, particularly those who have crossed the nuclear threshold, or about to cross it, joining the NPT with the least delay. Given the importance of securing the participation of the threshold countries in the NPT regime, we should leave no avenues unexplored in order to ensure their speedy accession to the Treaty.

In this regard, I wish to thank wholeheartedly all those members of the Conference on Disarmament for their unanimous endorsement of Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala for the presidency of the fifth NPT review and extension conference scheduled for April - May 1995. Ambassador Dhanapala is too well-known to the CD to be introduced. Members of the CD are well aware of his competence, diplomatic skills, impartiality and above all his high sense of devotion to the multifaceted subject of disarmament. I am confident that he will discharge his duties as the President of the review and extension conference to the utmost satisfaction of the States members of the NPT, that they so richly deserve, by virtue of their unanimous support of him.

Agenda item 5 of the Conference, "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", is another important subject to which my delegation attaches great importance. As the United Nations Secretary-General in his message to the Conference remarked, "admittedly, the best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth". It is true that we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons, for what is done cannot be undone. However, prohibition of nuclear weapons, as in the case of chemical weapons, is not beyond the realm of possibility. It is attainable within our means. What is required to achieve this noble objective is the same political will that was amply demonstrated in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention. Future generations might yet question why the leaders of nuclear-weapon States failed to display sufficient courage and wisdom to outlaw this category of weapons, when such a measure was within their grasp at the tail end of the twentieth century.

While the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains our ultimate objective, until that is achieved, it is imperative that the international community adopt effective and binding international arrangements to assure

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non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those who have acceded to the NPT, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We share the view expressed by many delegations that negative security assurances (NSA) should be provided through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding international agreement, rather than through declarations of a unilateral character. As we have pointed out on previous occasions, there is no justification, whatsoever, for the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those who have become parties to the NPT, to live under a perpetual cloud of nuclear annihilation. Guarantees on the part of nuclear-weapons States will constitute a positive confidence-building measure among nations of the world, and help remove the great psychological burden of the well-founded apprehensions and suspicions entertained by non-nuclear-weapon States. Against this background, it is not out of place for my delegation to express its hope that, as we proceed in the direction of a CTBT, the Conference on Disarmament would also work towards an international agreement on NSA with the same tenacity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ola Dahlman, to introduce the Group's progress report on its thirty-seventh session.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I do appreciate this opportunity to present the results of the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/1245, which has been circulated. This session was held from 7 to 18 February and experts and representatives from 29 countries participated. The Group enjoyed throughout the session the eminent services of the secretariat.

The Group's session was focused on the planning and the preparation of its forthcoming large-scale technical test, referred to as GSETT-3. As you may recall the objectives of GSETT-3 are to: develop and test new concepts for an international seismic monitoring system, building upon previous experience; to provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information; and to develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be set forth by the Conference on Disarmament.

This extensive global experiment could provide the nuclear test ban Committee with more specific information relating to a future international seismic monitoring system (ISMS), as follows. The station network designed for GSETT-3 could provide a basis for the final design of the ISMS. The functions and products which have been designed for the experimental International Data Centre could be a guide to the functions and products required from the ISMS. The detailed instructions and procedures developed for GSETT-3 could provide a good foundation for an operating manual for the components of the ISMS. The hardware and software developed at the experimental IDC which is being established in Washington, D.C. and at existing and new seismological stations, and the experience gained by system operators around the world, would provide a valuable infrastructure that could facilitate the rapid implementation of the ISMS. The results and experience which will be obtained as GSETT-3 evolves could be used in modifying the system design and in estimating system capabilities, staffing requirements and

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operating instructions of the ISMS. And finally, GSETT-3 could provide valuable information on costs associated with the establishment and operation of the ISMS.

The Ad Hoc Group established at its session in August 1993 three working groups to facilitate the planning, the operation and the evaluation of GSETT-3. Based on documents prepared by these working groups the GSE undertook in-depth consideration of the various aspects of GSETT-3. As a result of the efforts of the working groups, substantial progress has been made regarding the preparations for GSETT-3. Particularly noteworthy is the rapid progress in establishing and starting operations at the IDC. Plans for conducting and evaluating GSETT-3 have been developed in considerable detail and an outline has been established for the extensive documentation needed for the experiment. There are, however, some areas of concern, as noted by these working groups. Few countries have so far provided stations for the ongoing tests; this may delay the testing of procedures at the IDC. If the desired participation is not obtained before the end of the year this might put the whole test in jeopardy. The successful operation of the IDC during GSETT-3 depends on supports from participating countries for both software and personnel. A plan was presented for involvement of personnel from a number of countries in the operation of the IDC, thus obtaining international staffing of that important facility. Significant contributions from experts and national data centres in the participating countries are needed for the evaluation of GSETT-3. More detailed summaries of the present work in the working groups are annexed to the progress report.

I would like to emphasize the importance of securing adequate participation in GSETT-3. Obtaining a station network with good global coverage is essential to meet the objectives of GSETT-3. Although some countries have, during the last two weeks, made valuable commitments of important stations, still only 19 of the 53 stations selected for the primary, or alpha, network have been provided by their host country. It is therefore most important that a number of countries, most of which are CD members or observers support GSETT-3 by providing the desired stations. A summary of the countries from which commitments are needed to obtain adequate station coverage during GSETT-3 is annexed to the progress report. The Ad Hoc Group appreciates the offer by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to assist in obtaining a wider participation in GSETT-3. In addition to contributing seismic stations, a country might participate by providing a national data centre or personnel to support the operation of the IDC or in the evaluation process. Countries may also, through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, provide technical and financial assistance to other countries whose participation is essential.

The current plans call for the full-scale tests to begin by 1 January 1995. A schedule to meet this goal is given in the progress report. It is difficult to assess, at this time, the ultimate duration of commitments needed for GSETT-3. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should, however, be prepared to support their national facilities and their communication links for a minimum of one year after the start of the full-scale experiment on 1 January 1995.

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As previously noted, the infrastructure of the international seismic monitoring system is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data also from non-seismic techniques, for example radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound. During the session the Group received two national reports on networks for monitoring radionuclides in the atmosphere.

The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of three informal technical meetings since its previous session. During 9-11 August 1993, Finland hosted an informal workshop in Helsinki on the issue of seismic detection methods. On 2 November 1993, the United States hosted a tour and an informal demonstration for CD ambassadors of the facilities of the experimental International Data Centre (IDC) being developed for GSETT-3 in Washington, D.C. During 10-14 November 1993, Italy hosted a workshop in Erice, Sicily on planning and procedures for GSETT-3.

The Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Group agreed to invite the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee's Working Group on Verification to its next sessions. The Ad Hoc Group received a request from the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to provide a report summarizing the knowledge and experience on the upcoming GSETT-3. The report should contain elaborations on the overall concept of GSETT-3, the functions and components of such a system and matters of organization and cost. In order to be timely for the Ad Hoc Committee it was requested that the report be presented to the committee on 23 and 25 March 1994. The Ad Hoc Group appointed a small group to prepare a draft of such a report to be presented in layman's language so that it can be directly used in the work of the NTB Committee and its Working Group on Verification.

To finalize the requested report and present it to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and its Working Group on Verification, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 21 to 25 March in Geneva. Thereafter the Group envisages to meet early in the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, at a date to be agreed upon during the March session, to continue its preparation for GSETT-3.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Dahlman, for introducing the progress report in document CD/1245. You will notice that the progress report contains, in paragraph 14, a suggestion to the effect that the next session of the Group be convened from 21 to 25 March 1994 in Geneva, to finalize its report summarizing the activities of the Group in the context of GSETT-3 and present it to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Therefore, at our next plenary meeting on 10 March, I shall put to you for approval the recommendation concerning the proposed dates (i.e. 21-25 March 1994) for the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group. So we will decide on this at our next meeting.

I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Mr. Kunieda.

Mr. KUNIEDA (Japan): As my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, let me, at the outset, congratulate you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and assure you of our full cooperation.

Today I have taken the floor to address a problem which the GSE faces in its preparation for GSETT-3. My delegation thanks Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the GSE, for the report which he has just presented to the Conference and wishes to avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our appreciation for the work of the GSE conducted under the able guidance of Dr. Dahlman.

In this report there are the following references, in its sixth paragraph, to the problem of the lack of sufficient commitments for GSETT-3:

> "The Ad Hoc Group expressed grave concern over the lack of commitments of participation of seismological facilities and stations to meet the objectives of GSETT-3. A good global distribution of seismographic stations and communications from these stations to the International Data Centre are essential to the success of the GSETT-3.
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> "... Countries can participate in GSETT-3 by contributing seismic facilities in their countries, by establishing communication links from these facilities to the International Data Centre, by participation of national data centres and by contributing to the evaluation process. In some cases, bilateral and multilateral cooperation will be important. Countries can also assist by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential."

Please look at page 8, that is the second page of Annex I of the report, to identify the countries which we are talking about.

Accordingly, my delegation echoes the appeals made by the Chairman of the GSE and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to those countries whose participation is indispensible for successful operations of GSETT-3, to commit themselves to the important experiment which is expected to form a basis for the verification system of a future CTBT. If the countries in question have not yet expressed the commitment at this stage simply because of the delay in the decision-making process, we will urge them to decide quickly. If there are any other reasons for the difficulty in making the commitment, we should discuss them and seek a solution. We are looking forward to hearing soon positive responses to our appeal, which, we consider, is indeed a serious appeal of the Conference on Disarmament as a whole.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his kind words addressed to the Chair and also for his statement urging, inter alia, Germany to do something. If I heard the last words correctly, he also offers Japanese assistance in financial terms.

I now give the floor the the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, please accept also my congratulations. The United States delegation will assist your efforts at this busy time.

I take the floor to acknowledge and endorse the excellent report that Dr. Ola Dahlman has introduced on the recent meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). I think we are all pleased that preparations for GSETT-3 are well under way, and we attach great importance to this seismic experiment. The GSE report provides important details about the experiment's schedule and preparation.

I would also stress the importance of wide participation in the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment. Delegations in this room can contribute to a successful experiment, but participation across each hemisphere is extremely important. A good global distribution of both alpha and beta seismographic stations and communications from these stations to the International Data Centre are essential to the success of the GSETT-3.

The recent GSE session saw several opportunities for valuable exchanges between the GSE and the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. The upcoming report by the GSE to the verification Working Group on the overall concept of an international seismic monitoring system and the implementation of such a system in the GSETT-3 experiment should provide the working group with pertinent information. Both bodies have much to gain by interaction and discussion.

Finally, there has been some concern raised about a proposal by the GSE to study how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for the collection, processing and distribution of data from monitoring systems other than seismic. It seems to make sense to my delegation to develop to the extent possible, a single data exchange system to handle all types of data. We should not rule out thinking about how this would be done.

The United States believes that the GSE should consider and discuss how to transmit, process, archive, retrieve, and distribute other types of data, such as data collected by some system of internationally or nationally operated radionuclide samplers, and hydroacoustic and acoustic and possibly other sensors. But, such consideration must be guided by the pace of work in the verification Working Group and must not detract from the GSE's priority task - the implementation of the GSETT-3 experiment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Mr. Besancenot.

Mr. BESANCENOT (France) (translated from French): Allow me first of all to congratulate you warmly on behalf of the French delegation on your taking up the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. We are sure that in your hands the Conference will make active progress in its work, and you know you can count on the full cooperation of the French delegation.

(Mr. Besancenot, France)

My delegation would like to thank Dr. Dahlman for introducing the report on the thirty-seventh session of the Group of Scientific Experts. It values the work done on this occasion and endorses the proposals made in the document. Nevertheless, there is a recommendation which my delegation is not in a position to approve: the recommendation in the third subparagraph of paragraph 11 that the Group of Scientific Experts should study how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for non-seismic monitoring techniques.

In its statement in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 14 February, my delegation clearly indicated that the principal task of the Group of Scientific Experts should, in its view, be to prepare for the full-scale international seismic monitoring network test known as GSETT-3. Accordingly, the issue of synergy between the various means of detection, and in particular the possibility that the means of communication and the data bank planned for the seismic network might be used for the benefit of other - non-seismic - monitoring techniques, should be examined by the Committee only at a later stage. Logic dictates that the Committee should first define the various components it deems essential for developing a credible verification system, before addressing ways and means of optimizing complementarity between these different means of monitoring.

In this context, my delegation does not of course rule out the possibility that the Group of Scientific Experts may subsequently be entrusted with the task of studying how the GSETT-3 data exchange system might be used for other non-seismic monitoring techniques; but it cannot endorse the proposal contained in the report of the thirty-seventh session of the Group that this should be one of the functions of the Group of Experts at this stage.

My delegation wishes the Group of Experts to take this position into account, failing which it could not accept the recommendations contained in the report of its thirty-seventh session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his kind words addressed to me and for his intervention that will certainly be taken note of. I now would like to give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. Your ability to crack the whip with charm and good humour has been demonstrated in several Chairs both here and in New York since you joined the CD. We enjoy seeing you performing in the Chair of the Conference itself.

I should like to congratulate Dr. Dahlman on his report and to thank him for it. My delegation attaches great importance to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and in particular to the work it is doing on GSETT-3. In our view nothing should be allowed to divert the Group's attention from their work on this. We note with satisfaction from paragraph 9 of the report that the Group is indeed concentrating on this aspect of its work. I should just like to make two comments. First, the establishment of the proposed GSETT-3 network is of paramount importance to the work of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. I

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

understand that not all the States on whose territory it is proposed to operate an alpha station have yet committed the necessary resources to participate in GSETT. We urge that those States who are not yet committed consider, as a matter of some urgency, their willingness to participate and allocate the necessary resources as soon as possible, so that the GSETT-3 network can be fully evaluated. Secondly, in the view of my delegation, it is sensible for the GSE to be in a position to respond to requests from the NTB Ad Hoc Committee or from its verification Working Group. We believe, however, that the direction is best provided by the verification Working Group. Early in the next part of this session, we will have, I am sure, a clearer idea of the verification needs of the CTBT. If the proposed International Data Centre is to play a major role in processing and archiving the data, they will need to know what volume of data from other monitoring systems could be expected, and how this should be handled to meet the needs of the treaty in the best possible way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and his kind words. Now I would like again to give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Mr. KUNIEDA (Japan): Mr. President, I thank you for granting me the floor for a second time today. With respect to paragraph 11 of the GSE report, which is, like other paragraphs, a result of discussions of the GSE, the Japanese delegation supports its contents and appreciates the Group for its decision to include this in its report. This is because, in our view, the GSETT-3 data exchange system, in particular the experimental International Data Centre, might also be used for the collection, processing and distribution of data from other monitoring techniques. Therefore, as long as the GSE is willing and able to study this possibility, we don't have to discourage them from doing this and, indeed, we should encourage them to proceed in that direction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his intervention. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it. I give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, I merely wish to say that the meeting scheduled for Thursday afternoon will be held at 3.30 p.m., and that also applies to this afternoon's meeting.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. We take note of this changed schedule for today and for next Thursday: NSA meeting at 3.30 p.m. I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Sir Michael WESTON: (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I just have a question. I think it was proposed during the meeting of the extended Bureau of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee that if there was to be a meeting of that extended Bureau, then in future it would be shown on the timetable. Am I to assume that the fact that it is not so shown means that the meeting which I thought was arranged for 9.30 on the morning of 9 March is now not going to take place?

The PRESIDENT: You may not, because the meeting will take place as pre-arranged. The NTB Committee will have an extended Bureau meeting, next Wednesday, 9 March at 9.30 a.m. in room I.

So with these explanations can we adopt the timetable? This seems to be the case.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our work for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.